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      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 02-3934
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PATRICIA MATADUMAS-BRICENO,
Appellant
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Dist. Court No. 02-cr-00476)
District Judge: Hon. Stephen M. Orlofsky
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 15, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 29, 2003 )
                         
OPINION
                         
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge
Appellant Patricia Matadamus-Briceno, a legal permanent resident who was
convicted of two felonies, challenges her sentence on the ground that the District Court
failed to adequately consider the impact of her likely deportation as a factor supporting a
downward departure for her sentence.  Jurisdiction in the District Court rested on 18
U.S.C. § 3231.  Jurisdiction in this Court is proper because the judgment is a final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and Matadamus-Briceno has a statutory right to appeal her
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the
District Court’s sentence.
I.
Matadamus-Briceno is a citizen of Mexico who was granted legal permanent
United States resident status on December 1, 1990.  On April 4, 2001, Matadamus-
Briceno was arrested by Penns Grove, New Jersey, police for possessing, producing and
selling fraudulent Resident Alien Registration and Social Security cards.  On June 7,
2002, Matadamus-Briceno appeared in District Court, and pled guilty to a two-count
Information filed the same day.  Count One charged Matadamus-Briceno with unlawfully
possessing Resident Alien Cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546(a) and 2.  Count Two
charged Matadamus-Briceno with producing false Social Security Cards in violation of
§§ 1546(a) and 2. 
A motion for downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances was
filed under the Sentencing Guidelines.  U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.6, 5K2.0.  Matadamus-Briceno
argued she is irreplaceable as the sole-caretaker and sole support system for her three
young children, one of whom is often ill and suffers from respiratory ailments. 
Matadamus-Briceno contended that the separation and possible permanent loss of custody
that would result from prolonged incarceration and/or deportation constituted an
extraordinary family circumstance.  The District Court rejected that argument, reasoning
that while it had discretion to depart for extraordinary family circumstances, the
circumstances in this case were not extraordinary enough to warrant a downward
departure.  On October 10, 2002, the District Court denied the motion for downward
departure, and sentenced Matadamus-Briceno to concurrent 24 month terms of
imprisonment on both counts, three years supervised release, and a special assessment of
$200. 
This Court exercises plenary review in evaluating whether the District Court
adopted the proper legal standard for interpreting and applying the Sentencing Guidelines.
 United States v. Castano-Vasquez, 266 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 683 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 727
(3d Cir. 1996).  A defendant may only appeal from the denial of a downward departure if
he or she alleges the district court committed a legal error; a defendant may not challenge
the merits of a district court’s discretionary refusal to depart.  United States v. Georgiadis,
933 F.2d 1219, 1222 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247
(3d Cir. 2000).
II.
“[F]amily ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.”
U.S.S.G. §5H1.6.  As Matadamus-Briceno acknowledges, “a downward departure based
on family ties and responsibilities should be the exception rather than the rule.”  United
States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2000).   That is, the family circumstances
must be extraordinary, id., but there is “no requirement that the circumstances be extra-
ordinary by any particular degree of magnitude,”  United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d
192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).  In evaluating whether a downward
departure is warranted, a sentencing court should consider what features potentially make
the case special or unusual, and whether the guidelines forbid, encourage, or discourage
departure based on those features.  Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996).   
Matadamus-Briceno argues the District Court failed to follow Koon in refusing to
consider whether the family circumstances were sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a
downward departure.  In particular, Matadamus-Briceno argues the District Court erred in
refusing to consider her likely deportation as a factor supporting downward departure. 
The record, however, is to the contrary.  The District Court specifically acknowledged its
authority to downwardly depart under U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0 and 5H1.6, but concluded that
the circumstances were not so extraordinary to warrant a downward departure. 
Matadamus-Briceno argues that in reaching this conclusion, the District Court “never
mentioned the deportation factor.”  While it is true that the District Court’s initial
discussion of “extraordinary family circumstances” was in the context of the impact of
incarceration, the District Court went on to address Matadamus-Briceno’s concern that
she would face deportation as a result of her conviction and incarceration, resulting in the
permanent loss of custody of her children.  Thus, the District Court properly considered
and rejected Matadamus-Briceno’s motion for a downward departure based on
extraordinary family circumstances.
Matadamus-Briceno also argues she was prejudiced by the District Court’s failure
to consider that a reduction of her prison sentence to less than 12 months would make her
eligible to avoid what would otherwise be a mandatory deportation.  Under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(P) a sentence of 12 months or more would result in these convictions being
characterized as an “aggravated felony” for deportation purposes.  The Attorney General
does not have discretion to waive deportation in aggravated felony cases, but does have
discretion in non-aggravated felony cases.  Matadamus-Briceno alleges the District Court
erroneously believed the Attorney General retained such discretion in all cases, whether 
or not the sentence is 12 months or more.
This argument is also unavailing, however.  As a preliminary matter, we review
this claim only for plain error because Matadamus-Briceno did not present this specific
argument at the sentencing hearing.   Matadamus-Briceno contends: “Defense counsel
attempted to explain that deportation was not guaranteed, but the court refused to explore
the possibility.”  Appellant Br. at 18.  While the record does indicate that counsel was
trying to explain that Matadamus-Briceno would not necessarily be deported irrespective
of what sentence was imposed, there is no clear articulation of the significance of the 12
month distinction.  Where a defendant has failed to object to a purported error of the
sentencing court, this Court will review only for plain error.  United States v. Couch, 291
F.3d 251, 252 (3d Cir. 2002).  To establish plain error, the defendant must show: “(1) an
error was committed; (2) the error was plain, that is, clear and obvious; and (3) the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”  United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 143 n.4
(3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).  To establish the third prong, defendant must
show that “were it not for the plain error committed...the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.”  United States v. Dixon, 308 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2002)
(emphasis in original).  
Under this standard, Matadamus-Briceno’s argument fails.  There is no indication
that the District Court would have chosen to downwardly depart if it knew the Attorney
General only had discretion to avoid deportation if a sentence of less than 12 months was
imposed.   Rather, the record clearly indicates the District Court considered the impact of
Matadamus-Briceno’s likely deportation on her children, even if it did not specifically
take into account the effect of a sentence of less than 12 months on her deportation status. 
The District Court simply concluded the facts did not warrant downward departure based
on “extraordinary family circumstances.”
Finally, while Matadamus-Briceno characterizes her claim as one for downward
departure based on extraordinary family circumstances, in essence Matadamus-Briceno
now seems to claim she missed the chance to obtain a downward departure that might
have changed  her immigration status.  But nothing in the sentencing guidelines even
permits the District Court to depart downward in order to influence the likelihood that the
government will deport a defendant.  The purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to
determine the appropriate sentence within the criminal justice system, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), not to alter the likelihood of deportation, which is governed by different statutes. 
1  Although there are cases that discuss to what extent unusual hardship flowing
from possible deportation can be considered, see United States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134
F.3d 551, 554 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing cases), a consideration of such hardships is
different from Matadamus-Briceno’s apparent attempt to seek a downward departure for
the purpose of altering her immigration status.  It is one thing for a court to consider the
effect of deportation on sentencing.  It is quite another for a court to consider sentencing
as a way to affect deportation. 
Thus, it is doubtful that the District Court could properly depart downward in order to
avoid mandatory deportation.1 
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence. 
                   
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Michael Chertoff                                
United States Circuit Judge
